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Abstract 
Using a longitudinal data for about 1800 persons observed between 1986 and 1991, this 
study investigates the incentive effects on short-term sickness spells of two important 
regime changes in the social insurance system in Sweden implemented in 1987 and 
1991. The results indicate that the rules influenced people’s decisions about when to 
report the beginning and ending of sickness spells. The 1991 reform, which reduced the 
replacement rate, had a stronger effect on reducing the duration of short-term absences 
than the 1987 reform, which restricted the payment of sickness cash benefit to only 
scheduled workdays.  
  
Key words: short-term absenteeism due to sickness, sickness insurance, reform, 
multiple spells, unobserved heterogeneity.  
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I. Introduction 
The rapidly rising absence from work due to sick leave, and related huge increase in 
compensation from the national sickness insurance system, experienced in last decade in 
Sweden has caused great political concern. Because compensation systems are 
politically sensitive to change, the economic burden has to some extent been passed 
over from the public insurance system to the employers by making those financially 
responsible for the short-term absences. While pure medical indicators show that 
Swedes gradually have become healthier, reported sickness points in the opposite 
direction. A rather heated political debate about incentive structure and potential misuse 
of the insurance system has followed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact 
on individual behavior, especially the duration and weekly time pattern of sick leave, 
caused by changes in the compensation system. I will focus on the rapidly increasing 
short-term sickness spells, since it seems obvious that the incentive problems are 
especially serious here.  
 In Sweden, the total number of reported sick days covered by the social insurance 
more than doubled between 1996 and 2002, and in 2002 they are 1.5 times higher than 
in 1992.1  In reality, the actual days of absence from work due to illness are even higher, 
due to the fact that since 1992 the financial responsibility for the first (two, three, or 
four) weeks of each sick leave period was moved to the employers (called the employer 
                                                          
1 The Swedish National Social Insurance Board (RFV) is the source of data for the entire paper. 
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period).2 The days paid by the employer are no longer recorded in the national insurance 
statistics, which makes it difficult (or almost impossible) to analyze the short-term  
sickness spells. To my knowledge, there are no available statistics about the total days 
of sickness covered by the employer after 1992. However, the statistics before 1992 are 
rich on information about short-term spells (i.e., duration of 7 days or less). For 
example, during the period 1988-1990, when the total number of reported sick days 
covered by the social insurance was approximately the same as in 2002, the spells of 
short-term absenteeism represented about 85% of all sickness spells, and accounted for 
about 23% of all days with a sickness benefit. In most of the cases, a medical certificate 
was required from day eight of each spell.  
 In both economic and psychological research, a common assumption is that 
individuals rationally allocate their labor supply by making daily decisions to attend the 
work or non-work setting with the highest expected utility.3  Thus one would expect that 
some of the short-term spells may be voluntary absenteeism, i.e.,  people might take 
some days off by reporting sick and receive the compensation of their loss of earnings  
(which is somewhat lower than what they would get if they would be working). 
However, in the political debate, the causes behind the rapid increase in the number of 
                                                          
2 Before January 1, 1992, all compensation for earnings lost during sickness was paid by the social insurance 
system, but since then, during the first days of a sickness period (called the sick pay period), employees 
receive sick pay directly from their employer. From 1992 to 1996, the sick pay period was 14 days, then 
through March 1998, it was 28 days, and since then it has once again been 14 days until July 2003, when it 
increases to 21 days. 
3  See e.g., Winkler (1980), Chelius (1981), Youngblood (1984), Lantto (1991). 
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sick days are highly controversial and especially whether there are strong disincentive  
effects on work from high compensation levels in the publicly financed sickness 
insurance system.  
 More than 12 important changes in the insurance rules have occurred since 1955, 
when the compulsory sickness cash-benefit insurance was implemented in Sweden. 
Most of them concern the waiting period before compensation, the time limit for the 
coverage and the compensation level. There are some previous Swedish studies 
analyzing the effect of the rules’ change on sickness absenteeism.4  Empirical results 
indicate that when the benefits become more generous, i.e., higher compensation rates 
compared to the previous period (as in 1963, 1967, 1974, 1987, and 1998), the number 
of sick days increase, and when the compensation rates decrease (as in 1991 and 1995), 
the number of sick days fall.5   
 The contribution of this study is an analysis of the effects of two important 
reforms (implemented in 1987 and 1991 in the Swedish social insurance system) on 
short-term sick spells (i.e., spell of seven days or less) Using a longitudinal data for 
about 4500 persons observed between 1986 and 1991, this study analyzes the duration 
                                                          
4 See e.g., Latto and Lindblom (1987), Johansson and Palme, (1996, 2002), Johansson and Brännäs (1998), 
Bäckman (1998), Lidwall and Thoursie (2000), Broström et al. (2002), Henrekson and Persson (2004), and 
Skogman Thoursie (2002). Economic incentives are captured by the after-tax wage rate, or the difference (or 
ratio) between the wage rate and the sick-leave compensation. The analyses are done either at a single point 
in time, or over time.   
5 See e.g., Lantto and Lindblom (1987), Bäckman (1998), Lidwall and Thoursie (2000), Johansson and 
Palme (2002), and Henrekson and Persson (2004). 
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and weekly time pattern of sick spells with regard to individual and labor market 
characteristics, but also with regard to characteristics directly related to the spells: 
diagnosis, the season when they occurred, the weekday when they started and the daily 
loss in earnings, controlling for changes in the rules and unobserved heterogeneity. 
 The next section mainly describes the institutional setting, and Section 3 
presents the data. The econometric specification and results are presented in Sections 4 
and 5 respectively. Section 6 summarizes and draws conclusions.  
II. Sickness cash benefit in Sweden, rules and statistics 
This study analyzes the period from January 1986 through December 1991, during 
which all residents of Sweden, aged 16-64 years, and whose annual income was at least 
6000 Swedish Krona (i.e., about 1100 US dollars in 1991) were eligible for a sickness 
cash benefit if they lost income due to sickness.6 The National Insurance Act gives no 
general definition of sickness, but according to the National Social Insurance Board’s 
recommendation, sickness is an abnormal physical or mental condition; if it reduces 
normal work capacity by at least 25%, the afflicted individual can qualify for a sickness 
cash benefit.7 Normal work capacity is defined as either the ability to perform the same 
task, or the ability to earn the same income, as prior to sickness.  
                                                          
6 This applied not just to employees, but also to the self-employed, who had a choice of applicable coverage, 
however.  
7 The sickness cash benefit is actually granted by the local social insurance offices. The National Social 
Insurance Board cannot set binding policy for them, but can only recommend its interpretation of law. 
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There were two social insurance reforms during the study period, effective 
December 1, 1987, and March 1, 1991. The changes that affected short-term 
absenteeism due to sickness are summarized in Table 1. 
< Table 1 here > 
Before December 1987,8 there was one unpaid qualifying or waiting day before a 
sickness cash benefit could be claimed. For sickness spells of 7 days or less (excluding 
the first day), the compensation was not provided for non-working days (at most, two 
days).9 However, during 1974-1987 it was possible to avoid the waiting period by 
reporting sick before midnight on the preceding day (even if this was a Sunday).10 
Starting with December 1987, the waiting day was abolished, and a sickness cash 
benefit was provided from the day the sickness was reported to the social insurance 
office. However, a cash benefit was now only provided for scheduled workdays during 
the first fourteen days of absence. Until March 1991, the sickness cash benefit replaced 
90% of lost earnings, while afterwards decreases to 65% for the first 3 days, and 80% 
from day 4 to day 90. The cash benefits, as many other social insurance payments, are 
linked to the so-called base amount, which is an amount of Swedish Krona, fixed one 
                                                          
8 The last reform before December 1987 was in 1974, when the sickness cash benefits were made taxable, 
and the replacement rate changed to 90% of the gross earnings. 
9 For longer spells, compensation was paid for all days, except the registration day.   
10 In 1985 some administrative changes (for state employees) implied that also the day for calling in sick and 
weekends were counted as sickness absence days. 
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year at a time.11 
Table 2 (which motivated the interest for this study) shows that about 85% of all 
sickness spells which ended in 1991 had a duration of 7 days or less, and accounted for 
about 20% of all days with a sickness benefit.12 On the other hand, sickness spells of 90 
days or more accounted for only 2% of the cases, but for over 55% of compensated 
days. 
< Table 2 here > 
The percentage of 1-7 day cases had been substantially lower in 1986 and 1987. The 
jump in 1988 (and thereafter) appears to relate to the fact that, from December 1987, the 
previous unpaid “waiting day” was eliminated, although the compensation was provided 
for only those days when people were scheduled to work.  
III. The data  
The sample used in this study is from the LS-database provided by the National Social 
Insurance Board of Sweden.13 It is a random sample of the entire population of Sweden 
who were eligible for a sickness cash benefit (i.e., annual income was at least 6000 
Swedish Krona and they lost at least 25% of their work capacity). It contains 
                                                          
11 The amount is appreciated in line with price changes, measured by the Consumer Price Index. The amount 
is also used when calculating the upper limit (7.5 times the base amount per year), which was SEK 241 500 
for 1991 (i.e., about USD 40 000 in December 1991, the end of the period analyzed here). 
12 During the study period, excepting one waiting day before December 1987, social insurance covered all 
days of employees’ sickness. 
13 LS stands long-term sickness. 
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information about all spells of sickness from January 1, 1986 through December 31, 
1991, with exact dates and employment status when they started and ended, and their 
diagnosis,14 but also about individuals’ demographic characteristics and their income.  
 Given the goal of this paper (to explain the length of the short-term absenteeism 
under different institutional settings), we select only spells of maximum 7 days. 
Descriptive statistics at the individual and spell level of the analyzed sample are 
presented in Appendix (Tables A1 and A2). On average, people had around 9 spells of 
short-term absence during 1986-1991. As Figure 1 shows, the frequency of one- and 
two-day spells increased substantially after the 1987 reform eliminated the unpaid 
waiting day, while the frequency of six-day spells decreased dramatically. The increases 
suggest strongly that the number of short-term sick leaves was affected by the 
availability of a sickness cash benefit from the first day after the reform. On the other 
hand, the decrease in six-day (but not seven-day) spells might be interpreted as a 
“timing” of absenteeism. 
<Figure 1 here> 
After the 1991 reform (that reduced the replacement rate) people seem to have 
returned to work sooner; i.e., the proportion of one- and two-day absences again 
increased for both samples, and the proportion of 6-day (and even 7-day) absences again 
decreased.  
Figures 2 shows the three regimes compared with respect to the weekday when 
                                                          
14 Most of diagnoses on short-term absenteeism are decided at the social insurance office based on the 
description that the insured persons give when they report their absence due to sickness.   
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reported short-term absences began and ended. Before the 1987 reform, the highest 
proportion of reported short-term sickness started on Tuesdays. In principle, the 
database is designed to record all days of sickness, including uncompensated days (such 
as waiting days and regular non-working days, mainly for the state employees). 
However, the Tuesday phenomenon could indicate that some spells recorded then 
during the first regime actually began on Monday (which would have been the unpaid 
waiting day). After the 1987 reform, this sort of “confusion” would have disappeared, 
and Monday clearly became the most “popular” starting day during the remaining two 
regimes. After the 1987 reform eliminated coverage on non-working days, there were 
also fewer spells reported starting on the weekend. The 1987 reform clearly had a big 
impact on the weekday when spells ended. Before the reform, spells ended most often 
on Sunday (regardless of when they started), but afterwards they ended most often on 
Friday. The 1991 reform made little difference in this respect.   
<Figure 2 here> 
IV. Econometric specification 
This study applies a multiple-duration model to estimate the hazard of ending the spell 
of short-term absence. I will estimate the hazard of ending the spell of short-term 
absence, by analyzing multiple spells of that length 1-7 days. 
In the applied econometric literature on the estimation of multiple-duration 
models, the range of different models is actually not very large. I will here apply the 
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proportional hazards model with random effects,15 an extension of the Cox model, 
which has become very popular for analyzing multivariate survival data.16 The model is 
also called the mixed proportional hazards model or the frailty model. A rather general 
description of frailty models has been given by Vaida and Xu (2000). Frailty models for 
survival data are the counterparts for mixed effects models for normal data; the main 
idea is to have a model that can handle survival times that are dependent within clusters.  
Frequently in the analysis of survival data (e.g., how long sick employees 
“survive” before returning to work, recurrent event times for a patient), survival times 
within the same “group” are correlated due to unobserved covariates. The approach 
taken here is to include such covariates in the model as frailties. A frailty term 
represents the common covariates that are not observed or are neglected. A frailty model 
                                                          
15 Van den Berg (2001) provides an overview of duration analysis, with an emphasis on models for multiple 
durations, especially on the mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model and its multivariate extensions. For the 
multivariate mixed proportional hazard model, in which the marginal duration distributions each satisfy an 
MPH specification, and the durations can only be dependent by way of their unobserved determinants, he 
discusses the dimensionality of the heterogeneity distribution, and compares the flexibility of different 
parametric heterogeneity distributions. 
16 Clayton (1978) and Oakes (1982) were the first to consider frailty models for multivariate survival data, 
using gamma distribution for the frailty. Hougaard (1986) introduced the G-family of distributions, which 
includes the gamma distributions and inverse Gaussian distributions. He also used the positive stable 
distribution for the frailty, along with arbitrary and Weibull hazards. Lu and Bhattacharyya (1990) used the 
Weibull distribution to model the frailty parameter, while Whitmore and Lee (1991) studied a model with 
inverse gamma frailties. 
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is a random effects model for time variables, where the random effect (the frailty) has a 
multiplicative effect on the hazard. This model can be used to describe the influence of 
unobserved covariates in a proportional hazard model, for example with multivariate 
failure times generated independently given the frailty for “groups” (both for survival 
times for related individuals, like twins or family members, and for repeated events for 
the same individual).17 These frailty random block effects generate dependency between 
the survival times of the individuals that are conditionally independent given the frailty. 
Here I will assume that all individual variation in the hazard function can be 
characterized by a finite-dimensional vector of observed explanatory variables x and an 
unobserved heterogeneity term u.   
(1) )exp()(),;( 0 ijiiijij xuthuxth β= , i = 1, 2, …, G,  j = 1, 2, …, ni,  and 0 < t < t*, 
where hij represents the hazard rate of subject j in group i; G is the number of 
individuals; ni is the number of spells for each group, and t* is a time horizon. h0(t) is  
the baseline hazard function, and xij  are the explanatory variables, which in our data, 
except gender, all are time-varying. ui (ui=exp(σwi) can be interpreted as a function of 
unobserved explanatory variables. I assume a gamma frailty distribution, which is 
commonly used because of mathematical convenience.  
 
                                                          
17 Much empirical research in economics is concerned with the analysis of duration data. In many 
applications multiple durations of a given individual are observed with possible covariates. Examples of 
multiple-spell duration data can be found in Van den Berg (2001)’s survey. 
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V. Empirical Results 
Sick leave time pattern 
In the first step, a preliminary analysis of the short-term absences due to sickness was 
produced using nonparametric estimation (Figure A1 in Appendix). The hazard plots 
suggest that, in general, the closer was the beginning of the spell to the following 
weekend, the shorter was the spell, so that the most likely ending day was Friday. This 
effect is especially visible (in both of the following periods) after the 1987 reform, 
which restricted the coverage of the earnings lost only to scheduled work (which 
increased the probability of uncompensated weekends). These estimates suggest that 
there were differences across regimes, and also that, during each regime, there was a 
relationship between the weekday when the absenteeism started and its duration; i.e. 
spells that started at the beginning of the week were longer than those that started at the 
end of week. The result that (the few) absences that started on a Sunday or Saturday 
after 1991 are the longest, can be interpreted as an effect of the lower replacement rates 
during the first 3 days. If people are not scheduled to work, then they are not entitled to 
compensation during the weekends. Even though in practice for these employees these 
days were nor accounted as compensation days, it might happen that people expected 
that they will get, from the social insurance, 65% only on Monday (being the third day 
of the sickness spell), and 80% thereafter.    
 
Explanatory factors 
In the next step of the analysis, the effect of various factors on short-term absence due 
to sickness was estimated using a frailty model. Table 3 shows coefficient estimates, 
standard errors, and hazard ratios of the gamma frailty model, during the entire period 
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1986-1991, using dummies for the three policy regimes. Kendall’s τ was quite small 
(about 0.10), which suggests weak association within the groups. There was thus a 
relatively small significant random effect related to the duration of short-term absences.  
Women had about 22% higher hazard of ending short-term absenteeism than men. 
In general, the hazard of ending absenteeism was lower for older people, which means 
that younger people generally returned to work sooner. For nationalized Swedes and 
other foreign born individuals, for both samples, the hazard of ending absenteeism was 
about 82-86% of that of Swedish born people, which means that Swedish born generally 
returned to work sooner. A poor health background, selection to specific work 
environments due to ethnic background, and/or cultural differences might explain this. 
For married people, the hazard of ending absenteeism was slightly higher (about 10%) 
than for singles; i.e., married employees returned to work sooner.  
Although, the absence rate during summer months was the lowest during the year, 
the hazard ratios by quarter show that short-term absences that began during summer 
lasted longest. The hazard of ending absenteeism was about 81% of that of winter’s 
spells. Those whose absences started during the week (Monday-Friday) returned to 
work faster than those whose absences started on a weekend (i.e., 11-22% higher 
hazards).  
<Table 3 here> 
Daily earnings loss due to absence (computed function of potential earnings, 
replacement rate and ceiling’s level) is another factor that had a statistically significant 
impact on absence duration. For each 100 Swedish Krona in daily earnings loss, the 
hazard of ending an absenteeism spell went up by 0.5%. Regional unemployment, 
however failed to pass the significance test. 
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Persons with musculoskeletal and cardiovascular diagnoses, as well as injuries 
and poisonings, were slower to return to work than those with general symptoms. 
Neither of the previous sickness history variables (total cases and total cases of long-
term sickness) was found to be a significant determinant of short-term absence duration. 
The regime dummies are also statistically significant, and show that the 1991 
reform had an especially strong impact on absenteeism. After both reforms, people were 
more likely to return to work sooner compared to the period before December 1987: 
13% higher hazard after the 1987 reform and 32% higher after the 1991 reform. Given 
the differences on the magnitude of regime dummies, a separate analysis was also done 
for each regime, whose results are presented in Table 4. The gamma frailty model was 
estimated for the first two regimes, but a standard Cox model for the last.18  
<Table 4 here> 
Kendall’s τ was quite small (about 0.08) for the first two regimes regimes, which 
suggests weak association within the groups. During all three regimes, women returned 
to work faster than men (hazard ratios were in the range 1.24-1.30). In general, as one 
might expect, younger people returned to work faster than did older people. Across all 
regimes, the hazard of ending absenteeism for foreign-born people (whether 
nationalized or not) was always lower than that for Swedish born. In fact, it seemed to 
go down after the first reform, and it went down further after the second. The hazard for 
                                                          
18 The data for the last regime (i.e., after the 1991 reform) did not support the gamma frailty model, possibly 
due to a short time horizon for this regime. The EM algorithm computes a likelihood assuming 
independence, i.e., θ = 0, and then increases this values until it finds a likelihood which is larger than the 
likelihood at θ = 0. From there, it starts a numerical routine to find the root. If it cannot find that point, then 
it is considered the independence case. Therefore, only the first spell of short-term absence after the 1991 
reform was used, i.e., 559 spells out of 967 total. For the other two regimes there is a significant random 
effect related to absence duration by person.  
  16
ending absenteeism was higher for married people than for those who were unmarried, 
though it fell after the first reform, and still further after the second.  
The results again show that there was a timing of absenteeism with respect to the 
weekday when the spell began, after the 1987 reform. Regardless of which weekday 
their absence began on, employees were less likely to return to work sooner (compared 
to the weekend) before the first reform, and even after this reform (except for Friday), 
but the trend disappeared after the second reform.  
Daily loss of earnings had a modest effect. For each 100 Swedish Krona increase 
in daily earnings loss, the hazard of ending an absenteeism spell went up by about one 
half percent. The level of regional unemployment had no significant effect on absence 
duration before the 1987 reform, nor after the 1991 reform. This may suggest that the 
regional unemployment rate does not have effect on the duration of short-term 
absenteeism, but it is not excluded that it has effect on peoples´ decision of being short-
term absent from work. During all three regimes the hazard of ending absenteeism was 
lower for those with musculoskeletal and cardiovascular diagnoses, as well as those 
with injuries or poisonings, compared to those with general symptoms. 
 In comparison with the earlier studies, the unique feature of this study is the 
analyses the short-term absenteeism for three different regimes using individual 
longitudinal data. Some of the estimated results are in line with the previous findings, 
but some are adding more information. For example, Henrekson and Persson (2004), 
using time-series data for Sweden during 1955-1999, find that the 1987 reform has a 
positive effect, while the 1991 reform has a negative effect on sickness absenteeism, 
while my estimates show that both reforms have a significant positive effect on short-
term absenteeism. Johansson and Palme (2002) analyze the effect of economic 
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incentives on worker absenteeism in Sweden during 1990-1991, and find that the cost of 
being absent (computed under the settings of both sickness insurance and tax systems) 
has a significant effect on work absence behavior. Even though this paper analyzes only 
the effect of daily earnings loss on absenteeism (i.e., the sickness insurance settings) I 
find no significant effect after the 1991 reform, but significant effects for the two earlier 
regimes. For each 100 Swedish Krona increase in daily earnings loss, the hazard of 
ending a spell of ST- absenteeism went up by about one half percent before the 1991 
reform. This effect might be higher or lower if controlled for tax effects.  
 Moreover, Johansson and Palme (1996) model absenteeism as an individual day-
to-day decision. Analyzing the change in male work absence between 1990 and 1991, 
they found that the number of days compensated by sickness insurance in the kind of 
spells affected by the change in the compensated level (since March 1, 1991) decreased 
on average by 16%. The 1991 reform affected the short-term absenteeism the most, the 
compensation decreasing from 90% to only 65% during the first three days and 80% 
thereafter but, as mention previously, I do not find any significant effect of the daily 
earnings loss on the duration of short-term absenteeism after the 1991 reform. 
 Earlier findings (e.g., Henrekson and Persson, 2004, Broström et al., 2002) show 
that the economic incentives appear to be the predominant factor in explaining the 
higher work-absence rate of females. For example, one third of the gender difference in 
work absence behavior during 1990-1991 can be attributed to differences in costs of 
being absent (see Broström et al., 2002).  However, our estimates show that women had 
about 20% higher hazard of ending ST-absenteeism than men, which further research 
should consider when analyzing the sickness absenteeism using the registered data after 
1991. Nevertheless, this can give some input to the political debate that is still 
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concerned with the questions about why women are sick often and longer than men.  
VI. Summary and conclusions 
This study investigates the incentive effects on short-term sick spells of two important 
regime changes in the social insurance system in Sweden implemented in 1987 and 
1991. The results suggest that economic incentives are important determinants behind 
the observed time pattern of sick spells. There were significant differences across 
regimes, and also, during each regime, there was a relationship between the weekday 
when the absenteeism started and its duration. Those whose absences started during the 
week (Monday-Friday) returned to work faster than those whose absences started on a 
weekend. 
Women had about 20% higher hazard of ending short-term absenteeism than men. 
In general, the hazard of ending absenteeism was lower for older people, for Swedish 
born people, and for married. Persons with musculoskeletal and cardiovascular 
diagnoses, as well as injuries and poisonings, were slower to return to work than those 
with general symptoms. Neither of the previous sickness history variables (total cases 
and total cases of long-term sickness) was found to be a significant determinant of 
short-term absence duration. Moreover, the economic incentives (before taxes) had a 
modest effect, and the level of regional unemployment had no significant effect on 
absence duration before the 1987 reform, nor after the 1991 reform.  
In sum, the 1991 reform, which reduced the replacement rate, had a stronger 
effect on reducing the duration of short-term absences than the 1987 reform, which 
restricted the payment of sickness cash benefit to only scheduled workdays. After the 
1987 reform, fewer reported sickness starting on the weekend, and more on Monday. 
Generally, the closer to the end of the week was the beginning of the absence, the 
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shorter was the spell. In conclusion, the rules clearly influenced people’s decisions 
about when to report the beginning and ending of sickness spells.  
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Figure 1 Distribution of short-term sickness spell-durations under three regimes. 
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Figure 2 Distribution of short-term sickness spells by the day they began and ended 
under the three regimes. 
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Table 1 Social insurance rule changes affecting short-term absenteeism during 1986-
1991. 
Changes 
(in bold) 
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Jan 1986 - Nov 1987 Dec 1987 - Feb 1991 March - Dec 1991 
Coverage • The first day of 
reported sickness 
NOT covered. 
• Holidays NOT 
covered 
• The first day of 
reported 
sickness covered 
• Only scheduled 
work days are 
covered.  
 
Social insurance 
replacement rate 
(to a ceiling level)  
90% 90% 65% first 3 days 
80% day 4 - day 90 
90% day 91- 
Collective 
agreements 
 +10% +10% 
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Table 2 Sickness spells and the total number of sickness cash benefit days, by spell-
duration, 1986-91 (%). 
 
Year  
Cases of sickness concluded Days of sickness cash benefit 
1-7* days 8-89* days 90+ days 1-7* days 8-89* days 90+ days 
1985* 75.6 22.3 2.1 16.2 39.7 44.1 
1986* 76.9 21.1 2.0 16.8 38.1 45.1 
1987* 77.4 20.6 2.0 16.8 37.0 46.2 
1988  84.4 14.0 1.6 23.8 30.3 45.9 
1989 84.9 13.4 1.7 23.0 29.0  48.0 
1990 85.6 12.7 1.7 22.8 27.4 49.8 
1991 85.4 12.6 2.0 19.9 24.4 55.7 
 
*Before December 1, 1987, the day when the sickness was reported was not covered by social insurance, 
so that for most of the cases the number of actual sickness cash benefit days was 1-6, 7-89, and 90+. 
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Table 3 Estimation results for short-term absences during 1986-1991 (gamma frailty). 
Variables Estimate Standard error Hazard ratio 
Frailty 0.096 0.008 1.101 
Female (CGa: Male) 0.194 0.030 1.214 
Age (CG: -35 years)    
   36-45 years -0.046 0.032 0.955 
   46-55 years -0.136 0.035 0.873 
   56-65 years -0.203 0.044 0.816 
Citizenship (CG: Swedish born)   
   Nationalized Swede -0.195 0.061 0.823 
   Other foreign born -0.151 0.053 0.860 
Married (CG: Unmarried)          0.090 0.027 1.095 
Quarter (CG: Winter)    
   Spring -0.007 0.026 0.993 
   Summer -0.096 0.026 0.908 
   Autumn -0.028 0.025 0.972 
Diagnosis (CG: Respiratory)    
   Musculoskeletal -0.074 0.033 0.929 
   Cardiovascular -0.199 0.119 0.820 
   Mental -0.180 0.111 0.835 
   General symptoms 0.375 0.030 1.454 
   Injuries and poisoning -0.127 0.050 0.881 
   Other 0.376 0.024 1.456 
Weekday when absence started (CG: 
Weekend)  
    Monday 0.100 0.044 1.105 
    Tuesday 0.182 0.045 1.200 
    Wednesday 0.196 0.046 1.216 
    Thursday 0.193 0.047 1.213 
    Friday 0.178 0.049 1.195 
Previous cases b -0.001 0.001 -0.072 
Previous LTSc cases -0.006 0.024 -0.643 
Daily lossd (100 SEK) 0.005 0.001 0.475 
Unemployment Rate -0.005 0.011 -0.500 
Regime (CG: before Dec 1987)    
   Dec 1987 - Feb 1991 0.127 0.027 1.135 
   After Feb 1991 0.275 0.046 1.316 
Kendall's τ 0.046   
 no Frailty Frailty Chi-Square
-2 Log Likelihood 54312.35 53901.91 410.4417
 
Note: Bolds are significant for the IP sample at the 5% level, Italics for hazard ratio indicate that, for the 
continuous variables, it has been recomputed as phr = 100*(hr-1).  a CG indicates the comparison group. b 
Previous cases of sickness before the analyzed spell, since January 1983, regardless of their duration. c 
Previous cases of long-term sickness (LTS) before the analyzed spell, since January 1983, given that are 
at least 60 days of duration. d Daily earnings loss (before taxes) due to absence (computed function of 
potential earnings, replacement rate and ceiling’s level). 
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Table 4 Estimation results for short-term absences, by regime 
Variables 
Before Dec 87 
(n = 3580) 
Dec 87 – Feb 91 
(n =8326) 
After Feb 91 
(n = 559) 
Estimate S.E. HR Estimate S.E. HR Estimate S.E. HR 
Frailty 0.07 0.02 1.07 0.08 0.01 1.08    
Female (CGa: Male) 0.22 0.05 1.25 0.21 0.03 1.24 0.26 0.10 1.30 
Age (CG: -35 years)            
   36-45 years -0.03 0.05 0.97 -0.05 0.04 0.95 -0.17 0.12 0.85 
   46-55 years -0.19 0.06 0.83 -0.11 0.04 0.90 -0.21 0.12 0.81 
   56-65 years -0.29 0.08 0.75 -0.14 0.05 0.87 -0.38 0.14 0.68 
Citizenship (CG: Swedish Born)       
   Nationalized Swede -0.08 0.09 0.93 -0.20 0.07 0.82 -0.40 0.22 0.67 
   Foreign born -0.13 0.08 0.88 -0.14 0.06 0.87 -0.26 0.18 0.77 
Married 
 (CG: Unmarried) 
 
0.13 
 
0.04 
 
1.14 
 
0.08 
 
0.03 
 
1.08 0.02 0.09 1.02 
Quarter (CG: Winter)          
   Spring 0.01 0.05 1.01 0.00 0.03 1.00 -0.09 0.11 0.92 
   Summer -0.06 0.05 0.94 -0.09 0.03 0.91 -0.25 0.13 0.78 
   Autumn 0.05 0.05 1.05 -0.04 0.03 0.96 0.19 0.43 1.21 
Diagnosis (CG: Respiratory)      
   Musculoskeletal -0.15 0.06 0.86 -0.05 0.04 0.95 -0.15 0.15 0.86 
   Cardiovascular -0.41 0.25 0.66 -0.15 0.15 0.86 -0.24 0.52 0.79 
   Mental -0.32 0.19 0.73 -0.14 0.15 0.87 -0.45 0.43 0.64 
   General symptoms 0.19 0.06 1.21 0.39 0.04 1.48 0.73 0.13 2.07 
   Injuries & poisoning -0.18 0.09 0.84 -0.13 0.07 0.88 0.13 0.26 1.13 
   Other 0.24 0.05 1.28 0.42 0.03 1.52 0.47 0.11 1.59 
Weekday when absence started (CG: Weekend)      
    Monday -0.02 0.07 0.98 0.15 0.07 1.16 0.24 0.29 1.27 
    Tuesday 0.16 0.07 1.17 0.21 0.07 1.23 0.36 0.29 1.43 
    Wednesday 0.23 0.07 1.26 0.24 0.07 1.27 0.21 0.30 1.23 
    Thursday 0.20 0.07 1.22 0.25 0.07 1.28 0.21 0.31 1.24 
    Friday 0.25 0.07 1.28 0.20 0.07 1.22 0.29 0.30 1.33 
Previous cases b -0.01 0.01 -1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.20 -0.01 0.00 -0.48 
Previous LTSc cases -0.12 0.09 -11.51 -0.03 0.03 -2.49 0.07 0.07 6.74 
Daily lossd (100 SEK) 0.01 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.18 
Unemployment rate -0.02 0.02 -2.14 0.01 0.02 0.93 -0.02 0.05 -2.07 
Kendall's τ 0.03   0.04      
 
No  
frailty Frailty 
Chi-
Sq. 
No 
frailty Frailty 
 Chi-
Sq. 
No 
covariate Cov. 
Chi-
Sq. 
-2 Log Likelihood 15462.6 15422 39.9 34583.4 34435 148.9 6254 6174 79.7 
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Appendix  
Table A1 Descriptive statistics of individuals, 1991.  
Variable 
Insured population 
(n=1813) 
Insured population 
with short-term absence 
(n=1416) 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Age 44.56 11.25 42.68 11.17 
Gender (1= Female, 0=Male) 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Citizenship     
    Swedish born 0.88 0.33 0.88 0.33 
    Foreigner born 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 
    Nationalized Swede  0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
Marital Status     
    Unmarried 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 
     Married 0.74 0.44 0.70 0.46 
    Divorced 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 
    Widow/er 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 
Annual earnings (deflated, CPI 1997), SEK 183365 100998 189497 90523 
Absent during 1986-1991 0.78 0.43 1 0 
Note: Italics indicate dummy variables. 
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Table A2 Descriptive statistics of reported short-term absences by individual, 1986-
1991.  
Variables 
Insured population  
with short-term absence 
(n=1416) 
Mean Std Dev 
Total days short-term absent due to sickness, 1986-91  30.85 29.75 
Total days of short-term sickness, 1986-91, by diagnosis    
Musculoskeletal 3.71 8.68 
Cardiovascular 0.23 1.47 
Respiratory 15.66 16.60 
Mental 0.31 2.75 
General symptoms 3.34 6.06 
Injuries and poisonings 1.39 3.78 
   Others 6.21 9.12 
Total number of short-term sickness spells, 1986-91 9.11 8.19 
Total number of short-term spells, 1986-91, by diagnosis     
Musculoskeletal 0.93 2.12 
Cardiovascular 0.06 0.35 
Respiratory 4.25 4.10 
Mental 0.07 0.65 
General symptoms 1.20 2.02 
Injuries and poisonings 0.34 0.81 
Others 2.27 3.20 
Number of spells, by the weekday they began    
Monday 2.53 2.73 
Tuesday 1.95 2.27 
Wednesday 1.67 2.05 
Thursday 1.46 1.77 
Friday 1.02 1.48 
Weekend 0.48 1.01 
 
 
 
Weekday when the spell began 
 
 
 
a) Regime 1: before the 1987 reform 
 
 
b) Regime 2: after the 1987 reform & before the 1991 reform 
 
 
c) Regime 3: after the 1991 reform 
 
Figure A1 Hazard Functions (h) by the weekday when absences began, and by regime.  
